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over Personal Injury Tort and Wrongful Death Claims
Ishaq Kundawala*
I. INTRODUCTION

The current jurisdictional structure of bankruptcy courts in the United States
is nothing short of a mystery. Scholars, judges, and practitioners have long
struggled with finding their way through the confusing labyrinth of jurisdictional
rules, exceptions, and exclusions in our current bankruptcy system. Courts spend
countless hours each year considering all kinds of jurisdictional issues that arise
in bankruptcy cases. This results in a diversion of judicial resources from
substantive matters. Adding to this quandary is the limited scope of bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction over a small but very significant subset of claims-personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims-which weaves yet another layer of
complexity into an already complicated jurisdictional analysis. This additional
complexity mystifies even the most adept bankruptcy professionals.
The significance of this unnecessarily difficult jurisdictional analysis cannot
be overstated. Presently, the dramatic increase in the number of complex Chapter
11 corporate bankruptcy cases in our country, including the resolution of
hundreds of thousands of personal injury tort and wrongful death claims, is a
centerpiece of debtor reorganization efforts. These are definitely not low-dollar
claims at issue, and the claimants are indeed, in many cases, depending on a
speedy, fair, and efficient resolution of their claims and, ultimately, a monetary
distribution from the debtors.
Unfortunately for both the Chapter 11 debtors (who wish to reorganize their
enterprises as expediently as possible) and the personal injury tort and wrongful
death claimants (who are depending on fair yet prompt distributions), the debtor
reorganization process (including any resulting distributions to claimants) may
* Assistant Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. J.D., Tulane Law School; B.A., Austin College. I thank Nicole Saqui, Valerio Spinaci, and
Thomas Zeichman for their invaluable assistance. I also thank Professor Theresa J. Pulley Radwan of Stetson
University College of Law for her guidance and helpful suggestions. Last but certainly not least, I thank the
editors of the McGeorge Law Review for their attention to detail and good work on finalizing this Article.
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see considerable delays due to the jurisdictional constraints imposed on
bankruptcy courts. The influence of very powerful political lobbies has largely
shaped these constraints. Regrettably, the politically motivated product-the
current jurisdictional structure-lacks sound rational grounds.
The delay inherent in our fractionalized bankruptcy system is both inevitable
and highly problematic. As time passes, debtors' assets will in all likelihood
dissipate or depreciate, and the conditions of victims in personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims may further deteriorate. Thus, claimants will demand a
larger recovery against a smaller distribution pool. These claimants' hopes for
equitable and speedy recoveries diminish, as reality dictates that they must. A
prospective recovery of fifty cents or more on the dollar may eventually turn into
actual recovery of pennies on the dollar. This ill-fated reality must no longer be
ignored.
This Article will explore and examine the current jurisdictional structure of
the bankruptcy courts, the jurisdictional limitations of these courts over personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims, the historical basis for such limitations,
and finally, the various and substantial problems that continue to arise as a result.
Scholars have written numerous articles about the interplay between mass tort
law and bankruptcy, but none-until now-have concentrated exclusively on the
jurisdictional issues that arise with respect to the treatment of personal injury tort
and wrongful death claims in bankruptcy.
This Article begins anew the discussions regarding the efficacy of the current
jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy courts. These discussions should lead to
significant dialogue for the resolution of the serious problems facing both debtors
and creditors as a result of the fractionalized jurisdictional approach in our
current bankruptcy system.
II. JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS
The scope and breadth of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction has gone through
several iterations, from the first national bankruptcy act to the current
jurisdictional scheme, established by the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code (1984 Amendments).' As a starting point, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
vested jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters in the federal district courts. 2
However, the district courts referred the bankruptcy matters to specially
appointed "referees," rather than hearing the matters themselves.' These
1. In 1984, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act and created the
current jurisdictional scheme of the bankruptcy courts found in Title 28 of the United States Code. For a good
overview of the history and evolution of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, see generally Susan Block-Lieb, The
Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 531-38 (1998).
2. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545-46.
3. Block-Lieb, supra note 1, at 531.
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bankruptcy referees are the predecessors to modem bankruptcy judges and the
current bankruptcy court system.
Under the 1898 Act, much uncertainty arose over which disputes were
actually within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy referees appointed by the
district courts because of a confusing division of summary and plenary
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.4 Where cases did not fall under bankruptcy
jurisdiction (then known as summary jurisdiction), parties litigated such matters
(referred to as plenary jurisdiction) in other courts.' A complex and thorny body
of jurisprudence developed regarding which types of cases fell within summary
or plenary jurisdiction. Needless to say, this division caused many problems and
created some inconsistent results within the jurisprudence.
The report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
discussed the problems arising from the summary and plenary jurisdictional
allocations under the 1898 Act as follows:
There are . . . serious flaws in the present allocation of responsibility for

handling the administrative and judicial functions to be performed by the
Bankruptcy Act . . . . The first and most important objection to the

present dispensation is the division of labor between the bankruptcy
court and other courts . . .. There are several objectionable results to the
division of the jurisdiction of the judicial business generated . . . by
bankruptcy cases. The first is delay . . . . Another objection to the

division of jurisdiction is the extra expense entailed by the estate in
litigating outside the bankruptcy court.. . . The most serious objection to
the division of jurisdiction is the frequent, time consuming, and
expensive litigation of the question whether the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over a particular proceeding. As Professor McLachlan has

4. Id. at 532.
5. See Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction,3 DEPAUL Bus. & COM.
L.J. 383, 385 (2005) (discussing the relationship between summary and plenary jurisdiction prior to 1978).
The summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court stood in contrast to the bankruptcy court's lack of
jurisdiction over plenary matters, which were triable only by the district court or relevant state court.
The limitation on the power of the bankruptcy judge to hear and determine controversies such as
preferences and fraudulent conveyances (plenary jurisdiction matters) came to be regarded as a
major obstacle to the expeditious and efficient administration of bankruptcy cases.
Id.
6. Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem
Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 261, 267 (1999) ("The 1898 Act reduced the sweep of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction essentially through a return to the English in rem model of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, in the now-infamous summary/plenary jurisdictional dichotomy erected by the 1898 Act."). See
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 219 (1997). "This divided jurisdictional scheme was
widely condemned as cumbersome and inefficient, because it (1) prevented the bankruptcy judge with charge
over the bankruptcy case from deciding many issues of importance to that case, and (2) engendered
considerable litigation over which court had jurisdiction." Id.
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observed: 'When a "summary" proceeding in the bankruptcy court is
appropriate and when a plenary suit is required is one of the most
involved and controversial questions in the entire field of bankruptcy.
Consequently, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Act), which eliminated the division of summary and plenary jurisdiction over
bankruptcy matters and expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. In
fact, one of the primary objectives of the Act was the elimination of the
dichotomy between summary and plenary jurisdiction to concentrate all
bankruptcy jurisdiction into a single forum.8
The Act established a bankruptcy court in each federal judicial district as an
adjunct for each district court.9 Under the Act, the bankruptcy court judges were
appointed for fourteen-year terms, subject to removal on grounds of
incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability by the judicial council of
the circuit in which they served.'o The Act mandated the salaries of bankruptcy
judges, subject to adjustment." It also granted the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction
over "all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under Title 11."1 The Act vested concurrent jurisdiction in the district court and
the bankruptcy court over these types of proceedings, which allowed bankruptcy
courts to enter final judgments in matters considered plenary under the 1898
Act. 3
It is generally agreed that the Act made at least three significant changes
from the bankruptcy laws that immediately preceded it.14 First, the Act
substantially expanded bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction." Second, the Act gave
bankruptcy judges broader powers than those exercised by the former bankruptcy
referees." Third, and most significant, the relationship between bankruptcy courts
and district courts changed." Under the Act, bankruptcy courts became

7. In re Cemetery Dev. Corp., 59 B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr. D. La. 1986) (citing I REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Do. No. 93-137, at 88-91 (1973)).
8. Id.; see also In re Whippany Paper Bd. Co., 15 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (stating that "the
intention of this Code was to eliminate the summary-plenary distinction which engendered much litigation
under the Bankruptcy Act").
9. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 151 (2010)).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1), (e).
11. Id. § 153(a).
12. Id. § 1471(b).
13. In re Mid-States Express, Inc., No. 09-B10818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1969, at *694 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
July 2, 2010).

14.
15.
16.
17.

742

Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 53.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
independent from district courts, rather than being merely subordinate adjuncts of
the district courts. 8

This new legislative conferral of jurisdiction under the Act served to
consolidate bankruptcy matters into one forum-the bankruptcy court-rather
than sending litigants to various other courts to resolve their disputes.'9 Despite
this consolidation of jurisdiction into one forum, many problems still remained.
Perhaps a major reason for these continued problems was that Congress gave
bankruptcy courts many of the powers of Article III courts, but without Article
III protections such as life tenure and protection against salary diminution. As the
United States Supreme Court noted in the landmark case of Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., "[i]t is undisputed that the
bankruptcy judges whose offices were created under the Bankruptcy [Reform]
Act of 1978 do not enjoy the protections afforded to Article III judges."20
Prior to the 1984 Amendments, the Court in Marathon considered the
constitutionality of the broad conferral of jurisdiction under the Act to nonArticle III bankruptcy courts." In Marathon, a Chapter 11 debtor, Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. (Northern), brought in the bankruptcy court an
adversary proceeding against Marathon Pipe Line Co. (Marathon) seeking
damages for an alleged breach of contract and warranty, as well as for
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress." In the words of the Court, "Marathon
sought dismissal of the suit on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally
conferred Article III judicial power upon bankruptcy judges that lacked Article
III protections, namely life tenure and protection against salary diminution
,,24

The bankruptcy judge denied Marathon's motion to dismiss, but the district
court reversed on appeal and entered an order granting the motion on the ground
that the jurisdictional scheme of the Act was unconstitutional." The issue in
Marathon was "whether the Act violated the command of Article III that the
judicial power of the United States must be vested in courts whose judges enjoy
the protections and safeguards of Article III . . . . The Court, in a divided

18. Id.
19. Block-Lieb, supra note 1, at 533.
20. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 60. According to the Court, while bankruptcy courts "no longer have the
confusing dichotomy between summary and plenary jurisdiction," what exists today "is a confusing triple and
potentially quintuple division of proceedings among 'arising under,' 'arising in,' 'related to,' 'core,' 'noncore,'
and 'otherwise related proceedings."' In re Cemetery Dev. Corp., 59 B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr. D. La. 1986).
21. 458 U.S. at 50 (1982).
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 56-57.
25. Id. at 57.
26. Id. at 62.
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opinion, held that the Act's broad grant of jurisdiction violated Article 111.7 The
Court reasoned that "[t]he judicial power of the United States must be exercised
by judges who have the attributes of life tenure and protection against salary
diminution specified by Article III . . . ."28 The Court further reasoned that
"Article III bars Congress from establishing under its Article I powers legislative
courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters arising under the bankruptcy
laws . . . ."29
Marathon addressed a battle over the separation of powers among the three
branches of government, as well as a battle over the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction over public and private rights.o The Court noted that "the federal
judiciary was ... designed by the Framers to stand independent of the executive
and legislative branches of government-to maintain the checks and balances of
the constitutional structure and also to guarantee that the [judicial function] itself
remained impartial . . . ."" The Court concluded that the Constitution requires

that an independent judiciary, safeguarded by Article III, exercise the judicial
power of the United States.32 In other words, bankruptcy courts, which lacked the
protections of Article III, could not adequately decide matters traditionally
reserved for judges of courts enjoying these Article III protections.
Notwithstanding this declaration, the Court noted a distinction between
public and private rights, holding that the former came within the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy courts but the latter did not." By the Court's reasoning, "[t]he
public-rights doctrine is grounded in a historically recognized distinction
between matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and
Legislative Branches and matters that are 'inherently . . . judicial"' in nature."
The Court observed that at a minimum, "a matter of public rights must arise ...
between the government and others,"" while "in contrast, the liability of one
individual to another is a matter of private rights." Accordingly, the Court held
that Marathon's breach of contract suit against Northern, which arose under state
law, is a matter of private rights subject to adjudication before an Article III
court, not a non-Article III bankruptcy court. 7

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Id. at 58.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 69-7 1.
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After Marathon, bankruptcy courts no longer had jurisdiction to enter final
judgments in proceedings that were only "related to" bankruptcy cases and not
"arising under or in . . . cases under Title 11 ."" The Supreme Court held that
Congress might properly grant jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy judges
over matters that were central to the operation of the bankruptcy case, but not
matters that were only related to the bankruptcy case and predicated on private
rights. 9 The problem with this approach is that the line dividing what is central to
the operation of the bankruptcy case and what is merely only "related to" the
bankruptcy case, is often quite blurred.
The divided Marathon court did not issue a majority opinion. Instead, four
justices announced the opinion of the Court, with two justices concurring in the
opinion and three justices dissenting.40 In the wake of Marathon, the bankruptcy
court system was in crisis because there was little guidance as to what constituted
the grant of jurisdiction to these courts.41
Accordingly, many commentators urged Congress to clarify the scope of
bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.42 Interestingly, the Court stayed the Marathon
decision for a period of time to enable Congress to enact new legislation to
remedy these problems.4 ' However, the stay did not last for the duration of the
period between the Marathon decision and the 1984 legislation.44 During this
gap, all district courts adopted an emergency rule, or a slight variation of it,
which provided for the allocation of judicial power over bankruptcy cases. 41

38. Id. at 84-87.
39. See id. at 84-87.
40. Id. at 50-52.
41. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Jury Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional
Crisis of the Bankruptcy Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 258, 259 (1991) ( "[Tihe landmark decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. a cataclysmic
event, whose shock waves continue to rumble throughout the bankruptcy courts.").
42. Ann Van Bever, Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Courts:Awaiting a Final Verdict, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
799, 825 (1989).
43. Anne G. Maseth, Jurisdiction:A New System for the Bankruptcy Courts, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 8
(1985).
44. Id.
45. See Memorandum of Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 3 (Sept. 27, 1982). The
proposed emergency rule provided as follows:
(B) Reference to Bankruptcy Judges
(1) All cases under [T]itle 11 and all civil proceedings arising in or related to cases under [T]itle 11
are referred to the bankruptcy judges of this district.
(2) The reference to a bankruptcy judge may be withdrawn by the district court on its own motion or
on timely motion by a party. A motion for withdrawal of reference shall not stay any bankruptcy
matter pending before a bankruptcy judge unless a specific stay is issued by the district court. If a
reference is withdrawn, the district court may retain the entire matter, may refer part of the matter
back to the bankruptcy judge, or may refer the entire matter back to the bankruptcy judge with
instructions specifying the powers and functions that the bankruptcy judge may exercise. Any matter
in which the reference is withdrawn shall be reassigned to a district judge in accordance with the
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According to Anne Maseth, "[t]he emergency rule became effective as of
December 25, 1982 and remained in effect until the 1984 Amendments were
enacted on July 10, 1984."46
The 1984 Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act codified the current
jurisdictional scheme for bankruptcy courts found in Title 28 of the United States
Code.47 Three sections of Title 28 are particularly important with regard to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction: §§ 151, 157, and 1334.
Section 151 describes the functions of bankruptcy courts.48 It provides that,
"[i]n each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that
district." 49 It further makes clear that, "[e]ach bankruptcy judge, as a judicial
officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under this
chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and may preside alone and
hold a regular or special session of the court, except as otherwise provided by
law or by rule or order of the district court.""o
Significantly, the 1984 Amendments refer to bankruptcy courts and judges as
"units" of the district courts, rather than "adjuncts" of the district courts, as under
the Act. In other words, the bankruptcy judge is a judicial officer of the district
court. As such, bankruptcy judges may exercise only the authority conferred to
them under Title 28 with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding. The critical
difference is that under the 1984 Amendments, "bankruptcy courts do not
exercise all jurisdiction vested in the district courts. Instead, the bankruptcy court
is established as a unit of the district court to which the district court may refer
any or all cases and proceedings."'
This seemingly minor change in terminology from adjunct to unit is critically
important when one considers the constitutional challenge of the bankruptcy
court system in Marathon. Recall that in Marathon, the Court held that
bankruptcy courts were not valid Article I adjuncts to the Article III district
courts because the essential attributes of the judicial power did not remain in the
Article III courts.52 Under the structure created by the 1984 Amendments, the
judicial power now remains in the Article III district courts.

court's usual system for assigning civil cases.
Id. at 3.
46. Maseth, supra note 43, at 9.
47. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(1984); 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1984).

48.

28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984).

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. In re Mid-States Express, Inc., No. 09-110818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1969, at *694 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
July 2, 2010).
52. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982).
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Before turning to § 157, it is necessary to
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. Section
jurisdiction and abstention over bankruptcy
jurisdiction, § 1334 (a) and (b) provide in pertinent

understand which court has
1334 covers the issue of
matters." With respect to
part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under [T]itle 11.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act
of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts
other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under
[T]itle 11, or arising in or related to cases under [T]itle 11.5 4
Under the 1984 Amendments, the district courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases arising under Title 11 ." However, one must
keep in mind that the language of § 1334 (a) and (b) make a distinctions between
bankruptcy cases and bankruptcy proceedings. The terms "bankruptcy case" and
"bankruptcy proceeding" are not interchangeable. A bankruptcy case refers to the
debtor's entire Chapter 7, 9, 11, 12 or 13 case (from commencement to
termination of a case), whereas a bankruptcy proceeding refers to any discrete
dispute arising within the debtor's bankruptcy case; i.e., a contested matter (claim
objection, motion for relief from the automatic stay, motion for use of cash
collateral, etc.) or an adversary proceeding (a civil suit seeking avoidance of a
fraudulent or preferential transfer, etc.).16 It is important to note that the term
"proceeding" is quite inclusive and, as such, it covers anything that occurs in a
case; i.e., it would encompass contested matters, adversary proceedings, plenary
actions, and disputes with respect to administrative matters under the current
bankruptcy law.
Under § 1334(b), the district courts have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over three types of civil proceedings: (1) those arising under Title 11;
(2) those arising in Title 11; or (3) those related to cases under Title 11.5 While
each of the these types of proceedings is subject to the district courts' original but
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The topic of abstention is beyond the scope of this Article; however, for a good
overview of abstention in bankruptcy, see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.05 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1996). It is also important to note that the rules regarding abstention vary depending on whether a "proceeding"
is characterized as "arising under," "arising in," or "related to," a case under Title 11 in section § 1334(b).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b) (emphasis added).
55. Id. § 1334(a).
56. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUprCY, supra note 53, at 1 3.01.
57. Id.

58. 28 U.S.C. §1334(b).
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not exclusive jurisdiction, it is still necessary and important to determine which
type of proceeding is at issue because the type of proceeding impacts the rules
regarding abstention and venue, among other things. 9 Unfortunately, the
distinction between these three types of proceedings is sometimes obscure.6
Core proceedings under § 157 correspond to both proceedings "arising
under" or "arising in" a case under Title 11 " Civil proceedings "arising under"
Title 11 involve claims for "relief created or determined by a specific statutory
provision," while proceedings "arising in" are commonly "administrative type
matters that arise only in bankruptcy cases . . . .,,62 A few examples of
proceedings "arising under" Title 11 cases include, but are not limited to:
proceedings related to relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code; proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences under
§547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; and proceedings related to determinations of
the validity, extent, or priority of liens. A few examples of proceedings "arising
in" a case under Title 11 include, but are not limited to, proceedings related to the
allowance or disallowance of claims, assumption or rejection of executory
contracts or leases, and objections to discharge.64
The last type of civil proceeding over which bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction is a non-core proceeding that is "related to" the bankruptcy case. A
bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction covers matters that impact the
bankruptcy estate, and it is broader and more expansive than the jurisdictional
categories of "arising under" or "arising in." In the landmark case of Pacor,Inc.
v. Higgins,66 the Third Circuit devised the following test to determine whether
"related to" jurisdiction exists:
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil
proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that
59. Id. § 1334(c)-(d).
60. Nilsen v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 419 B.R. 807, 818 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). The specific types of core proceedings will be discussed in this Article, infra.
62. Neilson, 419 B.R. at 818; In re Mid-States Express, Inc., No. 09-B 10818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1969,
at *695-696 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 2, 2010) ("A proceeding 'arises under' the Bankruptcy Code if it 'invokes a
substantive right provided by Title I."'); I COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY, supra note 53 at 1 3.01 ("Many
authorities indicate that 'arising in' jurisdiction is a residual category of proceedings that do not fit within the
definition of 'arising under' but are still core proceedings because they deal with matters inherent to the
bankruptcy process.").
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (enumerating each of these examples under the list of "core"
proceedings).
64. Id.
65. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1995) (observing that the jurisdictional grant in 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b) "was a distinct departure from the jurisdiction conferred to bankruptcy courts under previous
Acts, which had been limited to either possession of property by the debtor or consent as a basis for
jurisdiction").
66. 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).
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proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in

bankruptcy. ... Thus,

the

proceeding

need

not

necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's property. An
action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's
rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or
negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt estate.67
The Pacor test appears to be the leading test for "related to" jurisdiction and
has received overwhelmingly positive support from the United States Supreme
Court and a vast majority of appellate courts." While initially this test seems
extraordinarily broad, the Pacorcourt observed that a bankruptcy court's "related
to" jurisdiction is not limitless.69 Proceedings "related to" the bankruptcy include,
but are not limited to, "causes of action owned by the debtor which become
property of the estate" under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and "suits between
third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate."o However, it is
critical to note that while a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear any non-core
matters that are otherwise related to a case under Title 11, the bankruptcy court
cannot enter a final order regarding the matter." Instead, in such a proceeding,
the bankruptcy court must submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court for consideration and entry of final judgment.72
Section 1334(b) confers bankruptcy jurisdiction on the district court, as
explained above, but § 157 allows the district court to refer this specific type of
jurisdiction and its related powers to the bankruptcy court.73 Section 157 provides
in pertinent part that "[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under
[T]itle 11 and any or all proceedings arising under [T]itle 11, or arising in or
related to a case under [T]itle 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for
the district." 74 While district courts have total discretion whether to refer
bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy courts, they almost
universally do. In fact, most district courts have rules in place that automatically
67. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
68. Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. at 308 n.6 (noting that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the Pacortest with little or no variation) (citations omitted).
69. 743 F.2d at 994.
70. Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. at 307 n.5 (noting that the "first type of 'related to' proceeding involves a
claim like the state-law breach of contract action at issue in Marathon").
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at § 157(a) (emphasis added).
75. John P. Hennigan, Jr., The Appellate Structure Regularized: The NBRC's Proposal, 102 DICK. L.
REV. 839, 854 (1998) (citing NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS,
Recommendation 3.1.3, at 731 n.1773 (1997) (noting that all district courts, except for Delaware, automatically
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refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy courts within their
districts without any further action." Once a bankruptcy case or proceeding has
been referred to the bankruptcy judge, the district court may still withdraw the
reference and take the case back. Section 157 governs the district court's
authority to withdraw the reference, providing for mandatory and permissive
withdrawal.
Section 157 also provides which types of matters bankruptcy judges may
hear and determine." Section 157(b)(1) provides in pertinent part, "[b]ankruptcy
judges may hear and determine all cases under [T]itle 11 and all core proceedings
arising under [T]itle 11, or arising in a case under [T]itle 11, referred under
subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments,
subject to review under section 158 of this [Tlitle."' 9
All cases are within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to hear and
determine, but not all proceedings are. Instead, only "core" proceedings "arising
under," "arising in," or "referred under subsection (a) are subject to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for both hearings and final determinations.o
Fortunately, the statute also provides a non-exhaustive list of "core" proceedings
which provides as follows:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under [C]hapter 11, 12, or 13 of [T]itle 11
[11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.] but not the
liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury
tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of
distribution in a case under [T]itle 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;

refer all cases to bankruptcy courts)).
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2006). As at least one court has pointed out, at the logical extreme of judicial
economy, all bankruptcy proceedings should be withdrawn since everything the bankruptcy court decides is
reviewable by the district court. See In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 295 B.R. 211, 216 (D. N.J. 2003). Obviously, this
is not the result that Congress intended. Id.

78. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
79.
80.
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(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate;
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter
15 of [T]itle 11.8

Recall that this is a non-exclusive list. However, if a matter is not "core,"
then it must obviously be "non-core." And if it is non-core, recall the limitations
on the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction under § 157(c)(1), discussed above. The
bankruptcy judge has discretion to determine whether a proceeding is "core" or

"non-core."82
As one should easily conclude, the current jurisdictional structure of the
bankruptcy courts is far from clear and readily comprehensible.83 Even now,
years after the 1984 Amendments refined the jurisdictional scheme, many

81. Id. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(P).
82. Id. § 157(b)(3).
83. The United States Supreme Court seriously questioned the constitutionality of the 1984
Amendments in the landmark case of Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg. 492 U.S. 33, 94 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress has legislated treacherously close to the constitutional line by denying a jury trial in a
fraudulent conveyance action in which the defendant has no claim against the estate."). While Granfinanciera
was really about jury trial rights in bankruptcy, the Court spent some time discussing the constitutionality of the
entire bankruptcy court system that the 1984 Amendments created. Id. at 61 & n.16, 63 n.17, 94.
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scholars still consider the jurisdictional scheme to be "bizarre"" and
"controversial." 85
While the jurisdictional scheme may be difficult to comprehend, it certainly
becomes even more complex after one considers the specific limitations of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over certain types of claims. There are certain
statutorily enumerated limitations on the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
personal injury tort and wrongful death claims; these limitations add yet another
dimension of complexity to an already difficult jurisdictional analysis.
III. LIMITATIONS ON BANKRUPTCY COURTS' JURISDICTION OVER PERSONAL
INJURY TORT AND WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS

A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims is substantially limited in scope. The 1984 Amendments made it
quite clear that Congress intended to remove judicial authority and control over
personal injury tort and wrongful death claims from the bankruptcy courts.86
Statutes preclude bankruptcy courts from entering any final judgments with
respect to personal injury tort and wrongful death claims. The statutes in
question, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and § 157(b)(5), provide in
pertinent part:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(2)(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or
exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or
interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under [C]hapter 11, 12, or
13 of [T]itle 11 [11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.]
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for
purposes of distribution in a case under [T]itle 11;81

84. Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Class Actions for Post-Petition Wrongs: National Relief
Against National Creditors,22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 46 (2003).
85. Daniel McCloskey, Celotex Corp. v. Edwards: The Supreme Court Expands the Jurisdiction of
Bankruptcy Courts by Barring Collateral Attacks Against Their Injunctions, but Some Questions Remain
Unanswered,24 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1071 (1997).
86. In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 79 B.R. 37, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), (b)(5).
88. Id. § 157(b)(2)(B). Note, however, that this provision does not-in most jurisdictions-prevent
bankruptcy courts from estimating personal injury tort or wrongful death claims for purposes other than
distribution; for example, estimating such claims for purposes of plan feasibility. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION §22.541 (4th ed. 2004).
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Further, § 157(b)(5) provides that:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as
determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is
pending.
These two provisions unquestionably strip the bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction
to finally adjudicate personal injury tort and wrongful death claims.9 Indeed, the
very purpose of § 157(b)(5) was to prevent bankruptcy courts from trying
personal injury tort claims.9 '
Lurking in the shadows, however, is the foundational question of what
exactly constitutes a personal injury claim. 92 This question must be answered
before determining whether the § 157 exceptions will constrict the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts. Of course, if a claim is not characterized as a personal injury
tort claim, then there are no limitations on a bankruptcy court's exercise of
jurisdiction, and such courts have the authority to finally adjudicate the claim
under their traditional jurisdictional powers conferred to them by the district
courts.
Unfortunately, neither Title 28 nor Title 11 expressly define the term
"personal injury tort claim."94 Consequently, courts continue to disagree as to
what constitutes such a claim.9 5 Three main views have evolved in the
jurisprudence-a narrow view, a broad view, and a middle approach.96
One court, espousing the narrow view, concluded that "the personal injury
exception under § 157 is limited to a narrow range of claims that involve an
89. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
90. Elkes Dev. v. Arnold (In re Arnold), 407 B.R. 849, 851-54 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009).
91. In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. at 532. However, the jurisprudence overwhelmingly
supports the proposition that bankruptcy courts can try personal injury tort or wrongful death claims by consent
of the parties. See Geruschat v. Ernst Young LLP (In re Seven Fields Dev. Corp.), 505 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir.
2007); Adams v. Cumberland Farms, No. 95-1736, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10458, at *6-7 (1st Cir. May 7,
1996); In re Wysong and Miles Co., No. 04-10005, 2005 WL 3723200, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005) (noting
that consent may be obtained through claim objection procedures).
92. See Moore v. Idealease of Wilmington, 358 B.R. 248, 250 (E.D.N.C. 2006). Note that the term
"wrongful death claim" is not subject to dispute. A wrongful death claim is simply "[a] lawsuit brought on
behalf of a decedent's survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious injury that caused the decedent's
death." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1644 (8th ed. 2004). See Carl v. City of Overland Park, 65 F.3d 866, 868
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting the elements of a wrongful death claim); Roque v. United States, 676 F. Supp. 2d 36,
42 (D. Conn. 2009) (describing the standard tort elements a wrongful death claimant must prove).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(B).
94. Moore, 358 B.R. at 250; Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.),
281 B.R. 154, 160-61 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002).
95. In re Ice Cream Liquidation, 281 B.R. at 160-61.
96. Id.
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actual physical injury." 7 For example, some courts require a finding that
emotional distress claims are so severe as to rise to the level of traditional
personal injury tort claims before concluding that such claims come within the
§ 157 exception." Courts often base this narrow view on the statements of a
congressman contained in the legislative history of § 157, which may indicate
that Congress intended the § 157 exception to be read only to apply to a narrow
range of claims.w
Likewise, other courts espousing the narrow view have excluded from the
purview of personal injury tort claims certain mental distress claims that do not
involve physical injury or trauma.'"0 Courts have also held that violations of antidiscrimination laws are not personal injury tort claims.'o' Obviously, a narrower
view results in fewer claims being classified as personal injury tort claims,
because courts using this view seem to require actual physical injury.
Other courts espouse a broader view of what should be considered personal
injury tort claims. Courts adopting the broader view do not limit personal injury
tort claims strictly to those claims involving an actual physical injury; instead,
courts taking the broader view have expanded such claims to include invasions of
personal rights.'o2 These courts seem to base their views on the lack of specificity
in the § 157 exceptions; that is, if Congress wanted to limit personal injury tort
claims to only those involving actual physical injury, then it could have done so
expressly in the statute itself.'
Under this view, courts have found that, "the term 'personal injury tort'
embraces a broad category of private and civil wrongs or injuries" for which a
claim for damages arises.'04 These types of claims could include civil rights
deprivations such as defamation and mental suffering.'05 Thus, adoption of the
broader view results in courts deeming more claims as personal injury torts and
thus outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.

97. Massey Energy Co. v. W. Va. Consumers for Justice, 351 B.R. 348, 351 (E.D. Va. 2006).
98. In re Atron, Inc., 172 B.R. 541, 544 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).
99. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 333) 576, 580 (Congressman Kastenmeier stated, "[the] personal injury tort claim
exception was intended to cover only a narrow range of claims").
100. In re Interco, Inc., 135 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
101. In re Cohen, 107 B.R. 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that personal injury tort claims comprise
the more traditional slip-and-fall or psychiatric impairment beyond mere humiliation and shame cases).
102. Unnamed Citizens v. White (In re White), 410 B.R. 195, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2008).
103. See id. (discussing Judge Stocks' view of what Congress intended in § 157). See also In re Poole
Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527, 530 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (finding that since Congress knew how to use
restrictive language and chose an unrestrictive definition of personal injury tort claim in § 157, "then it must
have intended such words be interpreted broadly").
104. In re Boyer, 93 B.R. 313, 317 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988).
105. Id.
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Instead, some courts choose a middle ground between the narrow and broad
views of how to characterize a personal injury tort claim. According to one court,
"[t]he middle ground encompasses torts involving bodily and reputational harm,
without including those personal injury torts designated by statute only."'0 Under
the middle ground approach, even defamation claims have been found to come
within the purview of a personal injury tort claim.'0 o
The courts adopting the middle ground find this approach fits more closely
with traditional understandings of common law torts; while this approach accepts
claims of emotional or reputational harm, it retains the power of bankruptcy
courts to define which claims are personal injury torts.'a Instead, other courts
may look to whether a claim falls within the purview of a personal injury claim
under the broader view, yet retain bankruptcy jurisdiction over the claim if it has
"earmarks of a financial, business or property tort claim, or a contract claim."
As one can clearly see, what courts classify and do not classify as a personal
injury tort claim is subject to much dispute and can vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The difficulty in classifying personal injury torts only adds another
layer of complexity in trying to comprehend the jurisdictional reach of the
bankruptcy courts. This complexity also adds to the inconsistent treatment of
claims. For example, a court in one jurisdiction may find a claim to be a personal
injury tort claim, thus placing the claim outside of the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. However, a bankruptcy court in another jurisdiction may find that
the same claim is not a personal injury tort claim, and thus within the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction.
Notably, some courts have questioned whether a distinction between
personal injury tort claims and contract claims should be made."o This raises an
important and critical series of questions regarding why federal law recognizes a
distinction between personal injury tort and wrongful death claims versus other
types of claims that arise in a typical bankruptcy case, such as contract or
property claims."' In order to understand how this distinction arose under federal

106. Elkes Dev. v. Arnold (In re Arnold), 407 B.R. 849, 852-53 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009).
107. Id. at 852.
108. In re Smith, 389 B.R. 902, 908 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008).
109. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160-61
(Bankr. D. Conn. 2002).
110. Id. at 160 (concluding that § 157's special treatment for personal injury tort claims was not
constitutionally required, but, rather, was a response to lobbying by the personal injury tort bar); In re Dow
Coming Corp., 215 B.R. 346, 353-54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that there is no rational way to
distinguish trial of a contract claim from trial of a personal injury tort claim in bankruptcy court and it would be
constitutional to try the latter in a bankruptcy court).
11. In re Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. at 353-54 (noting that "[tihere is no rational way ... [to]
distinguish the trial of a contract claim from the trial of a [personal injury] tort claim in bankruptcy court" and it
would be constitutional to try the latter in a bankruptcy court). See also In re Ice Cream Liquidation, 281 B.R. at
161 (concluding that the Constitution did not require § 157's special treatment for personal injury tort claims,
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law, we must examine the historical basis underlying the addition of these
various exceptions in the 1984 Amendments.

IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Congress enacted the 1984 Amendments for numerous purposes other than
resolving the issues that arose from the Supreme Court's decision in Marathon.'
In these amendments, Congress also eliminated bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to
finally adjudicate personal injury tort and wrongful death claims and preserved
claimants' jury trial rights."' The critical question that arises is whether Congress
eliminated bankruptcy court jurisdiction over these claims and preserved
claimants' jury trial rights because of a constitutional mandate or for other
reasons. 114
There are two pervasive theories regarding the underlying justification of
Congress' decision to eliminate bankruptcy court jurisdiction over these claims
and to preserve claimants' jury trial rights in the district court. On one hand,
unlike most other creditors involved in a bankruptcy proceeding who had
voluntarily associated with the debtor, personal injury tort and wrongful death
claimants had not voluntarily associated with the debtor."' Thus, according to
one theory, Congress intended to protect these involuntary creditors by
eliminating bankruptcy court jurisdiction over their claims and by preserving
their jury trial rights by requiring that their claims be tried in the district court."6
The more prevailing theory, however, is that Congress preserved these
claimants' jury trial rights as a compromise in response to the very strong and
powerful lobbying efforts of the personal injury tort bar.'1'7 It is no secret that
but, rather, the special treatment was a response to lobbying by the personal injury tort bar).
112. In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. at 353-54.
113. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5), 1411(a) (2006). Section 1411(a) provides, "[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and Title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an
individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort
claim."
114. Roos v. Red, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. at
353-54 (concluding that it would be constitutional to try a tort claim in bankruptcy court); In re Ice Cream
Liquidation,Inc., 281 B.R. at 161.
115. In re Arnold, 407 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009); Stacy L. Rahl, Modificationof a Chapter
11 Plan in the Mass Tort Context, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 192, 193-94 (1992); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Contracting Out Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1205-06
(2005).
116. See In re Arnold, 407 B.R. at 851 (attributing the exclusion of personal injury tort claims to
Congress' recognition that creditors stand in a different relationship with bankruptcy debtors because they did
not voluntarily enter into dealings with the debtor).
117. Roos, 30 Cal. Rprt. 3d at 456; In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. at 353-54; In re Clark, 75 B.R.
337, 339-40 (N.D. Ala. 1987); Alison J. Brehm et al., To Be, or Not to Be: The Undiscovered Country of
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during the early mass tort bankruptcy cases of the 1980s, personal injury
lawyers' initial experiences with the bankruptcy process were unpleasant."'
Personal injury attorneys were accustomed to trying their clients' cases in front
of juries in state or federal district courts, not by one judge in a bankruptcy
court." 9 Bankruptcy judges rarely awarded the same high level of damages that
juries might have awarded in state or federal courts.' 20
Thus, it should come as no surprise that these same attorneys and their very
powerful lobbies 2 ' ensured that, to the extent possible, future personal injury tort
and wrongful death claims would be treated differently than other unsecured
122
claims. Indeed, their strong lobbying efforts were successful. In fact, one court
noted, "[i]t is an open secret that in order to obtain a quick solution to the recent
bankruptcy dilemma, Congress inserted the right to jury trial in personal injury
and wrongful death claims as a compromise with the lawyers who represent
personal injury plaintiffs." 23 Several other scholars agree that, "[t]he passage of §
157 was the result of successful lobbying on the part of the personal injury bar to
limit the ability of bankruptcy judges to decide personal injury or wrongful death
claims and to preserve these claimants' right to a jury trial." 24
Consequently, as a result of successful lobbying efforts, the current
jurisdictional scheme of bankruptcy courts prevents bankruptcy judges from
resolving personal injury tort and wrongful death claims. Absent a change in the
Claims Estimation in Bankruptcy, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 197, 245 n.277 (1999); Sheldon S. Toll, Bankruptcy
and Mass Torts: The Commission's Proposals, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1997); Anthony
Michael Sabino, Jury Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bankruptcy
Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 258, 266 (1991); Patrick A. Murphy, The 1987 Rules Amendments, in SECURED
CREDITORS AND LESSORS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1987 557, 566 (Practising Law Inst.
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 435, 1987); Nina Easton, For Three Months,
Bankrupt Beggars Can Be Choosers, LEGAL TIMES, July 16, 1984, at 1 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Nancy Blodgett, Bad Law? Brickbats for Bankruptcy Code, 70 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (1984). See e.g.,
Robert J. Shapiro, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Under the 1984 Amendments: One Step Backward, One Step
Forward,3 BANKR. DEV. J. 127 (1986).
118. In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 281 B.R. at 161; In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. at 353-54.
119. Cf In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 281 B.R. at 161 (describing how the personal injury bar's
negative experiences in bankruptcy courts drove them to lobby Congress to eliminate bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction over personal injury tort claims).
120. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive
Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 899-900 (2008) (explaining tendencies of
juries to award exorbitant punitive damages).
121. The plaintiffs' bar is a very organized and powerful political lobbying group. For example, in the
2000-2004 election cycles, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America-the major national plaintiffs' bar
organization-contributed almost $11 million to political campaigns. Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley,
Defining What to Regulate: Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 347
n.449 (2006).
122. In re Ice Cream Liquidation, 281 B.R. at 161; In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. at 353-54.
123. In re Clark, 75 B.R. 337, 339-40 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
124. Brehm et al., supra note 117, at 245 n.277; Patrick A. Murphy, supra note 117, at 566; Sabino,
supra note 117, at 266; Toll, supra note 117, at 373-74.
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jurisdictional structure, § 157 limits debtors' ability to resolve their personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims to the district courts. In the next section,
this Article will examine some of the problems that have arisen as a result of
bankruptcy courts' lack of jurisdiction over personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims.
V. PROBLEMS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
PERSONAL INJURY TORT AND WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS

There are several notable problems and issues that have arisen, and continue
to arise, in bankruptcy cases due to bankruptcy courts' collective inability to
finally adjudicate personal injury tort and wrongful death claims. First, as
discussed earlier in this Article, there is an inconsistency among jurisdictions as
to the foundational question: what constitutes a personal injury tort claim?'25 This
inconsistency results in a court in one jurisdiction deeming a claim a nonpersonal injury tort claim, while a court in another jurisdiction deeming such a
claim a personal injury tort claim. This determination directly impacts whether a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.'2 6 Second, the fact that
this subset of claims cannot be resolved in bankruptcy courts creates delays for
both debtors and tort claimants, since these claims must be removed to other
courts for ultimate resolution.127
The inconsistency of bankruptcy courts' treatment of personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims cannot be overemphasized. The question of whether to
designate a particular claim as a personal injury tort or wrongful death claim
has-as we have seen-tremendous jurisdictional consequences for both the
debtor and the claimant. The fact that a court in one jurisdiction, but not another,
may see a particular claim as a personal injury tort claim obviously creates
inconsistent and unpredictable results for both parties. This pattern of
inconsistency also presents yet another reason for a debtor to engage in venue
shopping for a bankruptcy court before filing a petition for relief under Title
11.128

Recall the courts' differing approaches to classifying personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims-the narrow, broad, and middle ground approaches.129
However, even when bankruptcy courts agree-under whichever approach they

125. See supra Part IV.
126. Id.
127. See generally Mark L. Desgrosseilliers, Gimme Shelter: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures to Resolve Tort Claims in Bankruptcy, 18 Norton J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 19 (2009).
128. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11 (1991) (discussing the
issue of forum shopping within the bankruptcy court system).
129. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
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use-as to whether a claim is a personal injury tort claim, they may still disagree
on what they can and cannot do with that claim under their current jurisdictional
powers or lack thereof.
In the case of In re Johns-Manville Corp., the court made clear that
§ 157(b)(2)(B) could not be read in isolation to require that all personal injury
tort and wrongful death claims related to a bankruptcy case be tried in the district
courts.3 o The Johns-Manville court found that such an interpretation would void
the effect of § 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, regarding estimation of personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims, and make § 157(b)(2)(B) "superfluous."'
The court ultimately concluded that "section 157(b)(2)(B) ensures that only
district courts could enter final orders and judgments regarding the estimation or
liquidation of personal injury tort or wrongful death claims for purposes of
distribution." 32 The court went on to state that:
If the liquidation is by trial, under section 157(b)(2)(B), the trial must be
held in the district court. Jurisdiction remains with the bankruptcy court,
however, to make findings of fact and conclusions for de novo review by
the district court for purposes of distribution when liquidation is not by
trial and to estimate the claims for the purposes of allowance. 33
The Johns-Manville decision is among many other decisions that read the
jurisdictional exclusion of § 157(b)(2)(B) narrowly.'" Under this narrow reading,
bankruptcy courts not only retain jurisdiction to estimate personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims for purposes other than distribution, but they also may
disallow these claims on legal grounds and dispose of them through summary
proceedings. 33
130. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 B.R. 823, 825-26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
131. Id. at 826.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Bus. Solutions, Inc., 341 B.R. 415, 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
135. See, e.g., Foster v. Granite Broad. Corp. (In re Granite Broad. Corp.), 385 B.R. 41, 49 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (concluding that the "threshold determination of whether [the plaintiffs claims] are allowable and
whether such claims are subject to estimation for all purposes" was still within the authority of the bankruptcy
court); U.S. Lines, Inc. v. U.S. Lines Reorganization Trust (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 262 B.R. 223, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that the bankruptcy court may apply statutes of limitations and dispositive legal defenses in the
disallowance of personal injury claims including violation of procedures order related to such claims); ACR
Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Alexander (In re ACR Mgmt., L.L.C.), 329 B.R. 142, 143-33 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005) (stating
that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of personal injury claims even for distribution
purposes at any time prior to trial of such claims, but may not resolve such claims by trial); In re G-I Holdings,
Inc., 323 B.R. 583, 613 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (stating that the bankruptcy court may determine the validity of
personal injury asbestos claims as a matter of law during the claims allowance phase, but once a claim is
determined allowable, valuation must take place by a jury trial in district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
157(b)(5) and 1411); In re Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545, 549 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
bankruptcy court's disallowance of the claim on summary judgment based on no issues of material fact was not
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On the other hand, many courts have espoused a broad view of the
jurisdictional limitation. These courts instead hold that the district court must
make all dispositive rulings regarding personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims, even where the legal invalidity of the claims is clear.136
Thus, even in those instances where courts agree on one thing-whether a
claim is a personal injury tort claim-they may still disagree on the extent of a
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over that particular claim. In effect, there is
inconsistency among courts in both their classification of personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims and their respective jurisdictional treatment of those
claims. This creates two layers of inconsistency within the bankruptcy court
system with respect to this subset of claims. This double layer of inconsistency
seems highly undesirable in a federal judicial system which should at least strive
for uniformity in the application of bankruptcy law.'
Of course, inconsistency also presents itself in other ways. The debtors' other
creditors do not enjoy the same right to a jury trial, and thus the treatment of their
claims is inconsistent with the treatment of personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims. This disparate treatment often results in unequal bargaining power among

a final adjudication but was conducted in context of estimation for purposes of plan confirmation); In re UAL
Corp., 310 BR. 373, 380-82 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (discussing definitions of "liquidate" and estimate" as
fixing the amount of the claim and holding that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to disallow claims as
legally unenforceable before a jury right attaches to determine amount of claim); In re C&G Excavating, Inc.,
217 B.R. 64 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine validity of
personal injury claim and dismiss claim if it is time-barred); In re Dow Coming Corp., 215 B.R. 346, 360
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider an omnibus objection
to personal injury claims and disallow such claims on summary judgment); In re Standard Insulations, Inc., 138
B.R. 947, 952 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that no jury right exists at claims allowance stage); In re
Chateaugay Corp., Ill B.R. 67, 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that "[t]he bankruptcy court must have
jurisdiction to make the threshold determination of whether as a matter of law, a claim exists which can be
asserted against the debtor, even if the claim sounds in personal injury, tort, or wrongful death").
136. See, e.g., Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1991) (denying existence of both
core and non-core jurisdiction over a proceeding involving limitations defense to a personal injury claim);
Moore v. Idealease of Wilmington, 358 B.R. 248, 252 (E.D.N.C. 2006) (stating that, absent consent, "a district
court should retain control over all aspects of personal injury tort claims under § 157(b)(5)"); In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 74 BR. 146, 148-49 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (granting claimant's motion to transfer summary judgment
proceedings to the district court under § 157(b)(5) and finding that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to
rule on summary judgment where doing so could effectively adjudicate the claim); In re Coiner Pocket
Billiards, Inc., No. 04-04313-HB, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 162, at *7 (Bankr. D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2008) (refusing to
enforce settlement agreement as it would effectively liquidate wrongful death claim); Ogando Batista v.
Redondo Constr. Corp. (In re Redondo Constr. Corp.), No. 02-02887(GAC), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3831, at *7
(Bankr. D.P.R. June 29, 2006) (holding that it is for the district court to decide if the employment discrimination
case should be barred); In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc. 169 B.R. 374, 377-78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction to disallow a personal injury claim on limitations grounds because
doing so would effectively liquidate the claim as prohibited by § 157(b)(2)(B) and violate § 157(b)(5)).
137. See, e.g., In re Merritt Dredging, 839 F.2d 203, 205-06 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[a] uniform rule under
which federal bankruptcy courts apply their forum states' choice-of-law principles will enhance predictability in
an area where predictability is critical"); Four Queens Enters. v. Forbes (In re Forbes), 191 B.R. 510, 514
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1996).
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similarly situated claimants. Unequal bargaining power among claimants of the
same class can lead to inconsistencies in the calculation and settling of claims by
agreement.
The classification and treatment of these claims is not the only problem with
respect to inconsistency. Ultimately, when personal injury tort and wrongful
death claimants try their cases in front of juries in the federal district courts, they
risk obtaining dissimilar verdicts for similar types of claims among similarly
situated claimants." This risk of disparate treatment would likely be much less if
one bankruptcy court presided over the resolution of all such claims facing a
particular debtor."9
Inconsistency is one of the major problems with the current jurisdictional
scheme, but delay is another. Of course, in a judicial system that gives power to
bankruptcy courts for some matters (resolution of a debtor's bankruptcy case,
generally) but not others (resolution of the debtor's personal injury tort or
wrongful death liabilities), there will inherently be, as a consequence, some delay
and inefficiency.
There is little doubt that fractionalizing bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction
causes delay. 14 The division of jurisdiction over personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims between bankruptcy courts and district courts creates yet
another complicated procedural layer for the parties to resolve before they can
actually get to the heart of their disputes.142 This additional procedural layer
inevitably slows down the resolution process for both the debtor and the

creditors.143
A perhaps unintended, unexpected, and overlooked consequence for those
who proposed the limitations on bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction over personal
injury tort and wrongful death claims is that debtors, not creditors, benefit from
delay.'" A delay in the resolution of a debtor's bankruptcy case allows the
debtor-in-possession or the trustee to obtain greater concessions from creditors
138. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 570
(2005) (stating that "[tiort law leaves this question to the jury, which, without any guidance, is likely to produce
amounts that are unreliable, unpredictable, or both").
139. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115 (1997).
See also Alan N. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 183, 184 (2007). However, there may be constitutional concerns with respect to abrogating these
claimants' jury trial rights.
140. Block-Lieb, supra note 1, at 542 (stating that many of the 1984 Amendments actually undermine
efficiency due to the division of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over core and non-core proceedings and the
exclusion from core proceedings of "'the liquidation or estimation' of 'personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims for purposes of distribution').
141. Id. at 541-42.
142. Id. at 545.
143. Id.
144. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 747, 789 (2010).
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who are eager to recover at least part of their claim while minimizing their
collection expenses.145 Delays also expose creditors to competition from other
competing claims which may reduce the size of the bankruptcy estate.146 The time
value of money further incentivizes creditors to accept concessions over delay.147
These concessions are easily obtained in light of the reality. As the bankruptcy
proceedings are prolonged, debtors' assets will in all likelihood diminish and the
conditions of victims of personal injury tort or wrongful death claims will further
deteriorate. Thus, claimants will demand a larger recovery from a constantly
shrinking asset pool. The claimants' hopes for an equitable and speedy recovery
fade away. Potential recoveries of fifty cents on the dollar or more may transform
into pennies on the dollar with the passage of time.
Inconsistency and delay create problems for both debtors and creditors.
Obviously, for a debtor, it becomes quite difficult to propose a meaningful plan
of reorganization without knowing the full extent of the liabilities. And if the
resolution of personal injury tort and wrongful death claims delays the
determination of the debtor's liabilities, so then too will it delay the resolution of
the debtor's bankruptcy case and the ultimate distribution to creditors. Thus, the
claimants that are most likely to need a fair yet prompt resolution will be
prejudiced by a bankruptcy court's inability to provide one for them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional scheme of the bankruptcy courts is no doubt filled with
many complex layers. The jurisdictional limitations imposed on bankruptcy
courts with respect to personal injury tort and wrongful death claims were likely
imposed as a knee-jerk reaction to the Marathon decision and as a result of
successful lobbying efforts by the personal injury tort bar. Unfortunately, it does
not appear that Congress and the lobbies that influenced Congress gave much
meaningful thought to the consequences of creating a court system that must
resolve debtors' bankruptcy cases but at the same time is unable to fully resolve
all of the debtors' pending liabilities. In other words, the politically motivated
product-our current jurisdictional structure-lacks sound rational grounds.
It is time now that a conversation begins anew as to the efficacy of the
current jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy courts. Hopefully, this
conversation will lead to meaningful dialogue and perhaps some innovative
proposals regarding the resolution of the serious problems facing both debtors
and creditors as a result of the fractionalized jurisdictional approach currently in
place. Among these potential solutions, we should strive to address whether
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Congress should repeal the portions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1411 that restrict
bankruptcy courts from fully adjudicating personal injury tort and wrongful death
claims and whether or not bankruptcy judges should be elevated to Article III
status.
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